Showing posts with label 1975. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1975. Show all posts

Tuesday, 25 August 2015

1975 Referendum Book Scanned

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” 
George Santayana (The Life of Reason, 1905)


The 1975 referendum (on the then EEC) was the first ever nationwide referendum in the UK and so as a consequence there was no real direct experience for campaigners to draw upon. As a result many mistakes by both sides were made, not least in the failure of establishing a coherent message particularly from the anti-marketeers - with the word 'anti' portraying negative connotations. We can somewhat forgive many mistakes if we take the view that a lack of experience hampered the "out" campaign.

Now, with an impending referendum on the UK's membership of the EU due in 2017, there is no such excuse. In contrast we have the opportunity to learn not only from the referendum of 1975 but subsequent ones over AV and Scottish independence, and we can endeavour to try not to repeat mistakes made there.

The mistakes and lessons to be learned is laid bare in the wonderful 1975 Referendum book by David Butler and Uwe W. Kitzinger which with unerring and unintentional accuracy predicted many of the same problems 40 years ahead.

For any serious student of fighting the 2017 referendum this book is a must read. However, and no doubt not a coincidence, the book is becoming increasingly more expensive to purchase from websites such as Amazon.

So with this mind, this blog has scanned the entire book and its contents are now hosted by the kind efforts of EUReferendum.com. If we are to be serious about winning we must learn the lessons of the past. The 1975 Referendum book is as good as place as any to start.

Monday, 18 May 2015

EU Referendum: 51%

The cruel clarity of boolean outcomes inherent in referendums means that we need 51% of the vote to win the EU one in 2017. If we don't, we lose. It's as simple as that.

There are 45 million people who are eligible to vote although, 7.5 million of them fail to register by the general election of 2015. We may see a higher figure eligibility figure should there, like Scotland, be a last minute rush to register.

Most of all we have to consider turnout. This is hard to predict. In the 1975 referendum the turnout was 64.5%, the AV referendum was a very low 42.2%. Generally, turnouts for referendums have not been promising. Indeed of all of the twelve referendums which have been held in the UK only two have breached 64% in terms of turnout; Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement referendum, 1998 at 81.1% and the Scottish referendum even higher at 84.59%.

Assuming therefore, for the sake of argument, a turnout of between 65-70%, this would leaves us with between 29.3 million and 31.5 million potential voters. To achieve the magic 51% we would need to convince around 16 million voters.

Dr Eric Edmond highlights the difficulty of the task in front of us:
To win the in/out Cameron referendum requres [sic]a 51% vote in favour of leaving the EU. Last year in Scotland the SNP under Alex Salmond backed by Nicola Sturgeon and a superb organisation could only get 45% and we all saw how Nicola trounced Cam, Mil and Cleggy in the General Election debate.It shows the  enormity of the task we face to get a leave the EU vote. LibLabCon are not scared of the referndum [sic] vote. As things stand they would win it 2 to 1.

On 7th May UKIP won 12.6% of the national vote. To win the referendum they will have to quadruple that vote. That siimply [sic] cannot be done on UKIP votes. You need to attract millions of voters who voted LibLabCon.

On  7th May. UKIP got 3.8 million votes. LabCon got 20.6 million, the SNP and LibDems who are EU fanatics together got 3.8 million. So the Out campaign has to pick up roughly 10.5 million votes from LabCon to secure an out vote. That's a big ask.and with Farage anywhere near the campaign its impossible.
Eric Edmond, makes a crucial point. In any "out" campaign we need votes from those who have voted for anyone other than UKIP. And therein lies the danger when conducting a campaign which does not have a broad focus. Using the referendum to highlight issues of climate change, NHS, electoral reform, and immigration risks alienating the very voters across the political spectrum we need on board.

As Complete Bastard observers, language like "quislings, traitors and fifth columnists" with sometimes an ill-disguised anti Muslim feeling (who vote too) coupled with language on HIV infected foreigners will mean we comprehensively lose.

Ultimately the referendum will not be decided on the likes of myself who will vote 'out' regardless, nor on the likes of Nick Clegg who will vote 'in' but on the soft middle - the "could-be-persuaded-either-way". And it's here where we must make our case.

Sunday, 10 May 2015

EU Referendum: The Wilson Fudge Part II

 
On May 27th, we fully expect proposals for an EU referendum to be included in the Queen's speech. There are of course some doubters who are convinced that Cameron will renege - an understandable sentiment after his "cast iron" betrayal - but political reality says this time he will have no choice but to follow through with his promise.

Cameron has reiterated his promise publicly and consistently since the election and also to various media outlets. Should he not deliver his credibility would be shot to pieces, he will lose all political authority and his backbenchers would get rid of him sharpish.

So whether we like it or not an EU referendum is what we now face. In ideal world we would like the referendum to be free and fair. The reality is that by their very nature referendums never are. They are crude, blunt instruments which are easily manipulated by governments. It is for very good and obvious reasons that they are banned in Germany under their constitution, Basic Law.

Inevitably, therefore the eurosceptic movement faces a difficult and unfair battle, but it's not unwinnable. In our view, looking back at the lessons of 1975 the greatest threat is actually a lack of coherence from our own side and that is something which can be under our own control.

Another cause for optimism is that the way of manipulating a referendum by framing the question in such a way as to encourage a certain result is far more difficult. Here we have a defence against such manipulation in the form of the Electoral Commission (EC). It advises Parliament on what will be the most neutral referendum question, which it has already done:
The Commission’s recommendations therefore highlight an important decision for Parliament: whether to retain or move away from the UK’s recent experience of  referendum questions using ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses.

If Parliament wants to retain the use of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ as response options to the referendum question, then the Commission has recommended that that the question should be amended to:

'Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?'

If Parliament decides not to retain a ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ question, the Commission has recommended the following referendum question:

'Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?'

The responses would be ‘Remain a member of the European Union’ / ‘Leave the European Union’.

Research participants found this the most neutral of all the versions tested. 
Interestingly when we look at its full report, the EC would have had concerns over the question (and possibly the preamble) used in 1975 (pictured above). Referring to the proposed question in the European Union (Referendum) Bill during the last Parliament which was:
“Do you think that the United Kingdom should be a member of the European Union?”
The EC concluded on page 12, that "there were issues with the [phrase] ‘Do you think…?"
Use of ‘Do you think…?’
2.20 Views from participants on the opening phrase ‘Do you think…’ in the proposed question were split. Those who liked the wording thought it was neutral and personal, as if it was inviting someone’s considered opinion and encouraging them to think about the question. Younger people were slightly more likely than older participants to express a preference for this phrasing, because it made them feel that their vote was important.

2.21 Other participants, however, did not like the use of this opening phrase because they thought it was too informal, and likened it to a question that would be asked in an opinion poll survey. Some participants thought that the phrase ‘Do you think…’ implied that no action would be taken as a result of the referendum vote.

Use of ‘Should…’ instead of ‘Do you think…’
2.28 Four of the alternative questions included in the research (versions 2, 3, 4 and 6) included the use of the word ‘Should…’ in place of ‘Do you think…’. This alternative question introduction did not affect people’s ability to understand or answer the question according to their intentions, but some research participants preferred it because they felt it was asking them to state their choice or a decision about the issue, rather than their simply their opinion. These participants felt that the use of ‘Should…’ was more decisive and binding, and that the Government would take it more seriously, with action taken as a result.
While the EC settled on the word "remain", should the proposed question contain the word "stay", as it did in 1975 this would be subject to further assessment:
...the iterative nature of the research meant that it was not possible in the time available to fully explore and user test the impact of any variations to the wording (such as using alternative answer responses such ‘continue’ or ‘stay’ instead of ‘remain’, or using shorter versions of the response options).

If the Bill is amended to include this version of the referendum question, we would therefore undertake a further assessment of the intelligibility of this wording, including research, consultation and further testing in Welsh. We would also seek evidence from potential referendum campaigners about the impact of this approach.
Even the preamble on the ballot paper used in 1975 would cause problems. The phrase "the government have announced the results of renegotiation..." is likely to influence possible positive responses for staying in, as well as being too broad and vague. What results? What was renegotiated? As the EC states the preamble must be clear and neutral. Certainly if Cameron tried to add a preamble similar to the one used in 1975 onto the ballot paper we have the opportunity to challenge and seek clarification from the EC over its neutrality.

This time therefore we can have far more confidence in the neutrality of the question. However this won't prevent Cameron trying to repeat the Wilson renegotiation sham during the campaign.

This time we do have some advantages; experience informs us this will happen so we can be better prepared, we have two years to define Cameron's sham treaty before he can. In addition, while we accept that there will significant amount of "incoming" Cameron has helpfully informed us where the shells are going to land. With limited room for manoeuvre, he has already laid out his strategy of concentrating on 'small changes' under Article 48 regarding free movement of workers. Thus we are forewarned of the nature of the fudge to come. So by broadening out the eurosceptic case away from the very narrow focus on immigration reduces greatly the danger of us being outflanked.

Interestingly though there was a crucial impact the 1975 renegotiation, what Brussels dubbed "the so-called renegotiation", tactic had which no longer will have the same effect.

It wasn't so much the content (or lack of it) that mattered swaying opinion towards staying in but the delay that the protracted discussions caused. Negotiations took up a considerable amount of time...and time was on the side of continued membership.

The longer Britain remained a member, the more it reinforced the status quo effect. The delay from March 1974 when negotiations began through to the referendum in June 1975 virtually doubled the period over which Britain had actually been a member of the EEC. Over this period, Britain was progressively adopting EEC rules and adapting customs duties and other measures in accordance with the provisions for the transitional period. By the time the referendum came, Britain was getting used to being a Community member, thus swinging the status quo effect significantly in favour of remaining in.

The delay also had another benefit. In Spring 1974, the EEC was in disarray, notably over energy questions and Britain's rising prices were attributed to Community membership. If a referendum had taken place in March 1974, Britain would very likely have decided to leave. Wilson therefore needed time so that the decision could be made in more favourable circumstances.

After 40 years of membership, the status quo effect is fully established so this major impact of a Cameron fudge in this regard will be negligible. Even more so given that unlike 1975 we have an exit plan in the form of Flexcit.

So with one crucial advantage gone, being forewarned and with time to define Cameron's treaty early we can help nullify the damage that the so-called "reform" option presents us with.