Greece And The Euro: A Matter Of Politics Not Economics

"The process of monetary union goes hand in hand, must go hand in hand, with political integration and ultimately political union. EMU [economic and monetary union] is, and always was meant to be, a stepping stone on the way to a united Europe"
(Wim Duisenberg, first president of the EU Central Bank) 

"The single currency is the greatest abandonment of sovereignty since the foundation of the European Community: the decision is of an essentially political nature"

(Felipe Gonzalez, a Spanish former PM, 1998)

"Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises."  

(EU founding father Jean Monnet)

As the eurozone goes through one of its periodic 'difficulties' there's much fuss being made about a possible Greek exit, or Grexit. Today "Greece faces a critical 24 hours as European leaders hold an emergency summit in Brussels that could break the deadlock around the country's debt crisis".

We have of course been here many times before and naturally such speculation results in a media plethora of economic analysis, graphs and statistics and goodness what else.

There's often incredulous analysis on why Greece hasn't yet left Euro and go it alone and why it should; the economic case is one which is largely obvious.

Yet to make such an economic case is to miss the point entirely. What is so often overlooked is that the euro, and indeed the EU, is a political project not an economic one. And as the quotes above make clear the EU, and its member states, make no secret of this. But despite proclaiming its political intentions so publicly it is a damming indictment that we can no longer rely on the UK media to even acknowledge this simple fact, which perhaps reflects the prevailing UK view in general.

But it's in this political context we must see the Greek crisis. The euro has always been a political project to achieve its "ever closer union" as per the opening sentences in the Treaty of Rome 1957. "Ever closer union" is the utter founding principles of the EU; they meant it then, they mean it now.

To achieve full political union requires salami tactics or the Monnet method. Normally with a currency union we should start off with political union first and then economics. However due to the difficulties of achieving the political union part first the EU quite deliberately put the cart before the horse. By doing so they ensured the euro was a flawed project from the outset.

By making it flawed meant it was inevitable that it would encounter a series of crisis. Each crisis needs a solution and that solution, if we may call it that, invariably would be a call for 'more europe'. More Europe, more power, more integration. Thus step by step a series of euro problems allows the march towards further integration to continue unabated.

What could not be achieved explicitly by the front door would be achieved less obviously via the back door on the back of an economic Trojan horse - of ultimately economic misery. The euro is the extension of engrenage or 'the Monnet method' writ large:

The Schuman Declaration was presented by Schuman on 9 May 1950 (9 May was later to become Europe Day). Monnet and Schuman believed that it was through economic integration that political integration would eventually be achieved, via a process called spillover. Monnet and Schuman were thus the first functionalist theorists of Europe. Indeed, this process of integration is often termed the 'Monnet method'.

Yet much of this obvious point seems so beyond our own media who seem to be willing the Greece to exit to reinforce their misplaced, wrong and self-important analysis that the EU is all about economics rather than deal with the real issues as they are.

Thus despite all the brinkmanship and threats of Grexit, ultimately someone will put up some money, more than likely Germany, to paper over the cracks and the eurozone crisis will be left on hold until a new treaty comes along. Bailouts are de facto fiscal transfers - essential for an economic union to succeed. All that is needed is to make them official via a new treaty.

It's with some irony that the UK is aggravating the Greek crisis by having a referendum in 2017. By doing so it is holding up the new treaty to try to resolve the euro crisis; the Fundamental Law of the European Union which now has to wait until the "English question" is settled.

Despite the dreadful economic statistics Greece will stay in, politics and EU integration ambitions ensures that it must.

Oftel, Ofcom And BT

With this piece we seek to explore the nature of the regulatory structure of telecommunications within the UK as illustrated in the above diagram. The intention is an attempt at simplicity which is to look at national, EU and international regulation in turn.

However problems emerge in the sense that such dividing lines don't truly exist - the EU for example is a fundamental part of the UK government, as is international governance. This becomes especially so with telecommunications. An example is that the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) has a direct relationship with the UK regulatory body The Office of Communications (Ofcom) as do indeed EU bodies such as COCOM.

So while we wish to deal with each in turn as an attempt to illustrate clearly the very complex world of telecommunications, we appreciate that there is a very fine line to be drawn between attempting simplicity and being inaccurate. With this in mind the above picture showing the EU as a separate 'cloud' and the following piece should be viewed with EU and international governance in mind, and as a consequence much overlap will occur over the next few pieces.

Yet even on just a domestic basis regulation is continually being updated, the above diagram was relevant until April 2014. The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, merged the ineffectual Office of Fair Trade and Competition Commission (established in 1999) to create the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) meaning the diagram now looks more like this below:

Further domestic complexity was brought to the fore by the Scottish independence vote; that despite political and legislative devolution to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, there aren't any formal mechanisms which involve the devolved legislatures with representation in telecoms governance and oversight.

Governance at a global, EU, ministerial and and regulator levels exclude representation from the UK's four nations. For example in the Scotland Act 1998 which established a devolved Scottish Parliament, telecoms was kept as a "reserved" matter - a constitutional term meaning that it was to be decided by the UK Parliament as per Section C10:

1.     Telecommunications and wireless telegraphy.
2.     Internet services.
3.     Electronic encryption.

With Scotland rejecting independence recently, telecoms regulation remains a democratic challenge within the UK. Ofcom appointed the Advisory Committee for Scotland (ACS) to advise Ofcom "about the interests and opinions, in relation to communications matters, of persons living in Scotland." However as only an advisory committee it sits to one side, unelected and unaccountable. The same lack of 'devolution adjustment' also applies to Wales and Northern Ireland. This could be consider unsatisfactory when telecoms across the UK have different needs with regard to rural location, broadband and 2G, 3G 4G mobile phone access.

Thus not unsurprisingly, with this in mind, the demand for an independent Scotland to have a say in telecommunications regulation was made in its White Paper, Scotland’s Future – Your Guide to an Independent Scotland (page 276):

The government of an independent Scotland will have the powers to properly prioritise the needs of rural Scotland in relation to telecommunications...

Scotland's dissatisfaction with regard to a lack of representation laid bare on page 311 (my emphasis):

We have also felt the impact of other decisions in communications policy that did not take account of Scotland’s circumstances. When 3G mobile licences were auctioned in 2000, an initial coverage target of 80 per cent of the UK population was set. This was increased to 90 per cent of the UK population in December 2010. Despite the efforts of the Scottish Government, a distinct Scottish target was not set. Currently, 3G coverage in Scotland is the lowest of the four UK nations, reaching only 96 per cent on the most optimistic estimates. 

Furthermore, there is a disparity between urban and rural Scotland. Coverage in rural Scotland drops to as low as 92 per cent, demonstrating that there will always be poorer coverage in rural areas unless these areas are given priority in allocating licences.

A contrast could be considered between the lack of telecoms representation by Scotland within Ofcom and with Ofcom's broadcasting responsibility - where the BBC, with its Audience Council Scotland, has a representative member for Scotland on the BBC Trust which is currently Bill Matthews.

To explain Ofcom's lack of coherence we can see that one of the notably observations taken from the above graph as indicated by the arrows is that in terms of its relationships with other interested regulatory bodies Ofcom has a prominent central role to play in UK communications regulation. But it is a role that is always inconsistent.

The lack of consistency has been a consequence of a lively mix of ever evolving nature of technology, of the growth of "regulator watching" and of the ever integration of the EU and international considerations.

Domestically the implementation of privatisation of previously nationalised industries under Margaret Thatcher led to a growth of "regulator watching" with often mixed success for the customer, and this was particularly apparent in telecoms.

Ofcom's predecessor was the telecoms regulator Oftel. Oftel was established under the 1984 Telecoms Act  which had privatised the telecoms market, known as the "Abolition of British Telecommunications’ exclusive privilege". It was the first major privatisation by the then Conservative government.

Oftel was often accused, particularly towards the end of its regulatory life, of being very sympathetic to BT and with good reason. BT's relationship with the regulator Oftel was one of "coercive-diplomacy" rather than a telecoms company being more subservient to an assertive telecoms regulator.

The relative impotency of Oftel largely stemmed from BT remaining intact instead of being broken up; a decision which reflected the government's view on maximising proceeds from shares and future tax revenues on what was the world's biggest telecommunication company. But by remaining effectively as a monopolist telecoms company BT had every incentive to exclude competition by refusing interconnection between networks or threatening competition by fixing interconnection charges as high as possible.

So what followed was "coercive diplomacy" between the powerful monopolistic BT and its less powerful regulator. This somewhat uneven conflict was particularly encouraged by modifications to BT's operating licenses. BT was entitled to reject licence modifications proposed by Oftel under Section 12A of the 1984 Telecoms Act.

Thus despite privatisation, many difficulties were experienced by other companies attempting to enter a market wholly dominated by BT, particularly with its inherent well established infrastructure. A problem acknowledged by Oftel itself in its 1st report of 1984:

BT is competing in a large number of spheres of activity in the telecommunications industry from a position of significant strength, resulting from such factors as its established reputation and its established customer base supported by a selling organisation of extensive scope. Understandably many organisations have been apprehensive about the possibility of effect competition in this situation.

Problematic regulation and promotion of competition could also be seen when Mercury (Cable and Wireless) obtained its licence in 1985.

According to condition 13.1 of BT’s licence at the time, any competitor which had been licensed had to enter into a connection agreement with BT to run a connectable system and therefore needed connection to BT’s network. BT's reluctance to succeeded a measure of market share became apparent in 1985 when Mercury and BT had failed to agree terms for a connection contract.

So Mercury applied to the Director General of Telecommunications (DGT) to make a ruling under the conditions 13.5 and 13.6 of the BT licence. However while the outcome eventually favoured Mercury, who had incurred significant financial costs, the difficulties of overcoming BT's market place dominance meant that UK privatisation of telecommunications remained little more than a duopoly until the early '90s.

BT's dominance as underpinned by Section 12A meant it could bypass Oftel by threatening to force the issue to go for consideration by the then Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC) - a body which was eventually replaced by the Competition Commission in 1999, (given further powers under the Enterprise Act 2002) and then itself replace by the CMA.

By going to the MMC then open up the possibility of third party challenges to the cosy and convenient alliance of both BT and Oftel. Thus at the time Section 12A gave both strong incentives to negotiate terms to avoid uncertainties outside the charmed world of telecommunications that a third party may induce. The threat of a big stick in the guise of MMC gave each party a mechanism which could be used to bear down pressure on the other.

As a result Oftel was to suffer from "regulatory capture" by BT, eventually becoming as a regulator unfit for purpose. A successor was needed to further open up the telecoms market to competition. That came in the form of Ofcom whose prominence as the major regulator was established by The Communications Act 2003 (TCA)

Yet it was less Oftel's failings as a regulator that led to its demise but more a need to implement a number of EU directives into UK law which resulted in the Communications Act - EU Directives which unsurprisingly sought to further harmonise communications regulation across the European Union under the guise of modernisation but naturally implied a further step towards EU integration. Such EU Directives included; Directive 2002/19/EC, Directive 2002/21/EC, and Directive 2002/22/EC.

Using these EU Directives the then Labour government established Ofcom which inherited the duties of five separate other former regulators - the Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC) the Independent Television Commission (ITC), Oftel, the Radio Authority and the Radio Communications Agency.

Out of the TCA Ofcom became a "super regulator" and it comes as no surprise given Ofcom's inheritance that it was criticised for having "a too wide a brief". Not for the first time this was less a reflection of EU law and more the habitual enthusiasm of UK governments to gold plate EU law. Thus we have to query whether the initial establishment of Ofcom needed such a wide brief to comply with EU law or whether it was the political nature of the then Labour government which had unwelcome habit of reliance on big state solutions.

However it was not only the wide ranging powers that posed Ofcom problems but the inconsistency of those powers. Despite inheriting the briefs of the ITC, BSC and the Radio Authority it became clear that Ofcom was to have limitations in certain areas for domestic political reasons.

During the Parliamentary debate in 2002 on the Telecommunications Bill, Labour MP, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Tessa Jowell argued in support of the Bill that:

Finally, part 5 gives Ofcom tough competition powers to act concurrently with the Office of Fair Trading. Ofcom will be able to use general competition powers, but we are also retaining, very importantly, sector-specific competition rules for broadcasting—a vital part of protecting markets that do not deliver key policy objectives purely by leaving them to competition alone. Ofcom will have flexibility to use sector-specific powers, but it will not use them where it would be more appropriate for it to use general competition powers.

Reading carefully Tessa Jowell's statement indicates very clearly that the BBC was not to be fully within the remit of Ofcom a single independent regulator for the UK's broadcast media. From the outset its creation is fatally flawed as long as the biggest and most powerful broadcaster is not fully under the supervision of the independent regulator for the UK communications industries.

Other issues which became apparent with the TCA 2003, as is typical of the UK's relationship with the EU, was that it took advantage of EU legislation as an excuse to go further with lawmaking and introduce other controversial parts. An example being, Section 127 of the Act 2003 which makes it:

...an offence to make improper use of a public electronic communications network such as grossly offensive, indecent, obscene, menacing or annoying phone calls and emails.

This was used notoriously used against Paul Chambers who joked on Twitter that he would "blow Doncaster airport sky high", a charge which he was subsequently cleared by the Supreme Court in London.

With Ofcom we can see that a consequence of a national regulatory body emboldened by new powers is that they purse paths different from government national bodies unhindered. In the UK this was reflected by Ofcom's decision in 2003 having been established by the TCA 2003, in response to the telecommunications market developing rapidly, to conduct what it called a ‘root-and-branch’ strategic review of the regulatory regime.

Unlike its predecessor Ofcom, determined to breakup BT's monopoly further, concluded in 2005 a major strategic review of the fixed telecommunications sector by using its separate powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 - itself a result of EU Directives. The objective of the review was to determine whether the sector was suffering from competition problems of such a persistent nature that they could not easily be remedied using Ofcom's specific market review powers under the TCA.

The outcome of the strategic review meant that BT offered a host of undertakings to Ofcom by which it agreed to set up a separate network access division called Openreach (a so-called "BT group business") and also to offer its wholesale products on an equivalent basis to both external customers (Cable and Wireless, Carphone Warehouse etc) and its own downstream divisions. The undertakings have brought about a fundamental shift in the way in which BT had conduct business with all its customers, meaning all were now on a more equal footing in terms of wholesale access.

Thus despite the EU inspiration behind TCA and the Enterprise Act, from a regulatory perspective, the establishment of Openreach and its relationship to external customers is currently unique to the UK and is being actively studied by regulators in other European countries who experience similar competition problems arising from the presence of a large incumbent telecommunications operator.

The term "super-regulator" though does not mean Ofcom is the only regulator when it involves telecommunications, there are at least sixteen others and the list below demonstrates with great clarity the criticism that Ofcom has a brief which is too wide, and a reflection of the diversity of telecoms: it has its tentacles everywhere:

1)   Advertising Standards Authority (ASA)
2)   Telephony Preference Service (TPS)
3)   Ombudsman Services
4)   Communications and Internet Services Adjudication Scheme
(CISAS)
5)   PhonepayPlus
6)   Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)
7)   UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS)
8)   UK Safer Internet Centre
9)   Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP)
10) NICC - UK home of network interoperability standards
11) Go On UK - "empowering everyone in the UK to reach their digital potential"
12) NGN UK - dormant now part of OTA
13) Office of the Telecommunications Adjudicator (OTA)
14) Gambling Commission
15) Information Commissioner's Office
16) British Board of Film Classification (BBFC)

Not surprisingly with sixteen different organisations we have a complex mixture of Ofcom approved and EU financed regulatory structures. An example of the myriad structure can be found with the Internet Watch Foundation which came to media attention when it censored a Wikipedia page over an entry regarding an album cover by the German band The Scorpions. Here we see a registered charity, which works very closely with Ofcom (although Ofcom has no powers to regulate the internet) and receives EU funding. Susie Hargreaves the Chief Executive has also joined the BBFC’s Consultative Council.

Further evidence of the diversity and Ofcom's overreaching remit comes via the Advertising Standards Agency which describes a system as being one of "co-regulation of broadcast advertising" - it is self-regulation within a co-regulatory framework. It is underpinned by an enabling statutory instrument, The Contracting Out (Functions Relating to Broadcast Advertising) and Specification of Relevant Functions Order 2004 and a formal Deed between Ofcom and the ASA (Broadcast), BCAP and Basbof.

Interestingly Ruth Sawtell who is on ASA Council is also a non-executive director of PhonepayPlus, the regulator of premium rate telephone services.

In addition to the hydra nature of Ofcom, and its regulatory offspring, telecommunications are also responsibilities imbued within various government ministries and the agencies for which they are responsible, requiring within government itself a need for coordination as the table below illustrates (click to enlarge):

Thus it's apparent that even on a domestic basis telecoms regulation is diverse, overlapping and often incoherent. In the next piece we will move our focus away from domestic regulatory structures and turn our sights on the EU's role in UK telecommunications regulation.

Outside The Wall

It's long been this blog's view that the status quo effect will prevail in the Scottish referendum, especially when the "don't knows" are hovering around the 23% mark. Thus while the polls recently have become neck and neck in terms of in or out, bookmakers are still offering odds-on regarding a no vote.

With Scotland there is understandably a clear anti-establishment vote which has been relayed to the pollsters. Yet experience shows that this only translates to referendum results, or indeed other elections, if the resulting vote has no dramatic consequences.

An example of this is the non-binding referendum in New Zealand in 1992 regarding political reform. We also see the same apply in mid-term by-elections where anti-etablishment kicking is prevalent only to return to a default candidate at a General Election. Ireland proves to be another example when they rejected the Lisbon Treaty first time around only to approve at the second time when it was made clear "rejection would have consequences" regarding EU membership.

An interesting observation though is despite the obvious anti-Westminster vote within the Scottish referendum, Cameron, Miliband and Clegg have decided to encamp in Scotland for the day so that there will be no PMQs, thus demonstrating a wonderful illustration of arrogance and complete political blindness - seemingly unaware that their presence is more damaging than helpful to the Union cause. Subrosa is not impressed and rightly so:

Interesting times aren’t they?  Yesterday, in a token gesture to Scotland, the Saltire was raised over 10 Downing Street.  I believe it is to stay in place until after the referendum.  How happy I am to see such benevolence from London. Do I feel patronised?  Of course not.

Be prepared for the media to be overflowing with reports about the London heir bummers’ visit to our country and don’t forget to smile at their ignorance (or should that be arrogance?).

A point echoed by Norman Tebbit:

The political establishment down here in the Westminster village has been stung into hyperactivity by the sudden surge of support for the Yes campaign in Scotland. Without very much discussion with their own parties Ed Milliband and David Cameron have reached a joint conclusion: that Scotland's discontent can be overcome and a "No" vote secured by promising the Scots that they can have independence in all but name if only they vote to stay within the Union. Devolution by the bucketload, it is implied, would allow the Scottish assembly to tax and spend as it pleases while still remaining under the cover of sterling.

It seems to be a perfect example of why so many Scots are supporting the severance of the Union. In short, it typifies the remoteness of that Westminster establishment, not just from Scotland, but the people of England and Wales.

And again, more forcefully by Dan Hodges:

By the evening Gordon’s chat with a few of his constituents had become a full-blown plan to recast the Union. It was, Brown said, nothing less than a move towards a federal Britain. “A new Union is being forged in the heat of debate”, he said.

Great. But what debate? I’m not involved in it. You’re not involved in it. Unless I’m missing something, no one in England, Wales or Northern Ireland is being given a say over this radical new constitutional arrangement.

I’m not missing something. Gordon Brown was crystal clear yesterday. “These reforms will confirm that Scotland has helped changed not just our own country but the United Kingdom,” he announced. Well, thanks for that. But I’m afraid that’s not Scotland’s prerogative.

Scotland is currently holding a referendum over whether it wishes to secede from the Union. It’s a simple Yes/No question. Do you want to stay, or do you want to go? Not, “do you want to unilaterally establish the English, Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh Federation.”

’ll repeat, what do our politicians think they are doing? Whether or not Scotland remains a part of the Union is a matter for the Scottish people alone. It’s right they are having their referendum, and that they should have sole say over their destiny. But that is no longer what is on the table.

What is now being proposed – we are being told – is nothing less than an entirely new constitution for the United Kingdom as a whole. And no one other than the people of Scotland appears to be getting a say on whether they agree with it or not.

Actually, let me rephrase that. No one but the politicians appears to be getting a say.

Alex Salmond has some justification when he refers to "Team-Westminster". Team Westminster are clearly panicking and are offering overtly devo-max, this though is not new, it was offered quietly by Cameron some time ago. But how arrogant is it for Gordon Brown et al to now brazenly offer such terms without reference to anyone else in the Union  - it's our Union as well.

If nothing else the Scottish referendum demonstrates acutely that the arguments are less about Hadrian's wall and more about a circular symbolic wall around London, universally known as the M25.

We need this...

Article 50: No Sudden Movements

No country is an island (with apologies to John Donne). 

Geographically the UK is very obviously an island with all the benefits that brings, although not quite as comprehensively as is often imagined. However in many other senses such as economically, militarily and politically the UK is anything but.

The UK occupies a remarkably unique position in global affairs. It is the only state which is a member of the G8, G20, the EU, NATO, the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In addition the UK is a nuclear power and, despite current difficulties, has one of the largest economies in the world. We may no longer be an imperial power, but "punching above our weight" sometimes seems to be an understatement.

Thus it is clear that a country the size and importance of the UK leaving the EU is going to have very significant political and economic ramifications which will reverberate around the world. Greenland leaving the then EEC in 1985 is one thing, the UK leaving the EU now is an entirely different matter altogether. Just the effects on the EU alone would be profound, not least in reversing partly the political momentum for ever closer union and thus showing a different path for other member states. Other countries such as Ireland and Denmark may follow us out. We would be creating a precedent.

So while some arguments ensure over legal details such as whether "the Commission can do what they like in the two year process under Article 50" - it can't as I noted here, here and here - there are significant consequences that transcend the dry legalities of leaving.

One thing stock markets dislike intensely is uncertainty which is why market sensitive data is often released over a weekend when they are closed; thus any unilateral exit by the UK especially with no plan and no warning would clearly send the FTSE, the Dow Jones, the Nikkei et al smashing through the floor on a plummet trajectory.  Tearing up international agreements on an ad hoc basis is likely to lead to stock market crashes and history tells us where stock markets crashes end up.

We've had plenty of evidence on the sensitivities of the market during the Eurozone crisis, for example when, to the complete surprise of virtually everybody, including his own parliamentarians, Greek prime minister George Papandreou called a referendum to approve a EU bailout deal in November 2011:

Global stock markets dropped sharply as investors sold off shares after Greece's shock decision to hold a referendum on its eurozone bail-out package thratened to intensify the region's debt crisis.

London's FTSE 100 index of leading shares dropped more that 2pc, with markets in Germany falling, France, Spain and Italy sliding between 2.7pc and 4pc.

And not just the stock markets, the bond markets have also played an important part of the eurozone crisis. More so as bond markets generally have large power over countries again typified by the fate of Eurozone countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal.

So we come to Chancellor George Osborne whose entire strategy is effectively betting on being able to borrow on the bond markets at rock bottom rates. Osborne’s recovery plan is based on the hope that rates will stay pinned to the floor, and given that we're borrowing £3,000 a second he (and we) can’t afford for borrowing costs to overshoot, which they most certainty will do in the event of uncertainty regarding sudden exit from the EU. Escalating borrowing rates as a result are very likely to make Greece's situation look like a picnic in comparison..

And not just the bond market, there's also the sterling and the forex market, any movement on EU membership by the UK will have dramatic impact on the value of GBP, with economic consequences for us all.

So to leave without an orderly exit in place, in times of a fragile world economy, will have adverse economic consequences also for other countries to the ultimate and obvious detriment of our own. Any immediate destabilisation of EU membership by any member state would impact on the Eurozone undoubtedly dramatically ensuring it enters yet another crisis furthering affecting the UK economy.

Thus we have an international duty, in our own self interest if nothing else, to make sure our exit has to be as smooth and as structured as possible, and that can only be achieved by showing the international community we honour international agreements and are willing to follow due process. Undoubtedly an extensive period of foreshadowing our intentions beforehand is likely to be necessary to allow politicians across the world, the economy and the markets to price the change in.

Purely taking an English stance by seeking comfort in quotes from the Magna Carta and other Constitutional Acts which apparently bind their Parliamentary successors and hoping for the best without consideration of the UK's position in the world simply will not wash...