EU Referendum: Another Reason Why June 2016 Poll Is Unlikely

Despite frequent articles from journalists of the legacy media suggesting there could be a referendum as soon as June 2016, the Electoral Commission has made it perfectly clear (page 17) this cannot be possible as ten months must elapse between Royal Assent of the Referendum Bill and the poll.

The Electoral Commission recommends a six-month gap between passing of the law and the start of the referendum campaign. If then the referendum campaign includes designation, the combined campaign period would need to be four months, (page 6). Four months plus the six-month gap gives us the ten months.

With the Referendum Bill unlikely to receive Royal Assent before Christmas and the recommendation of a ten month window, as highlighted by this blog and EU Referendum, all but rules out a 2016 poll and certainly it rules out a June 2016 poll.

The Electoral Commission is a statutory body and thus its recommendations can be subject to judicial review. Recommendations have to be taken seriously as evident by its statutory advice over the referendum question change. The lack of reference to the Electoral Commission's recommendations by the UK media does bring into question its integrity and its less than candid nature.

Yet in addition to the Electoral Commission recommendations, another factor comes into play regarding a June 2016 referendum and it is one which has a more political significance than a legal one.

June 2016 is when UEFA is hosting its football championships in France. The draw, which involved three of the four Home Nations was made on Saturday, where one of the fixtures will be England versus Wales. Here then we will have a month of football in European wide tournament held in France - an EU member state which is a crucial and pivotal part of the EU.

With media build up to a tournament involving England it would seem inconceivable that Cameron is going to dump a referendum on the UK during a month long celebration of football particularly when a significant number of the electorate will have priorities more focused in a warm month on football, beer and barbecues.

A referendum held in these circumstances would almost certainly impact on turnout, and the results could be heavily influenced by how successful, or indeed not, the Home Nations performed during the tournament. Cameron would not want the referendum result to be influenced on the uncertainties of the mood of the nation over the fortunes of the unpredictability of football.

How a football tournament can influence politics can be seen during the debate on Scottish devoltuion in the 1970s:

The sharp rise in nationalist support, which registered in the first of the two general elections of 1974, prompted the Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, to make a commitment to devolution.

On June 22 Labour's Scottish executive met to ratify the Downing Street proposals on devolution. Unfortunately this was also the day of the Scotland V Yugoslavia World Cup football match and only 11 members turned up. Most of those who stayed away to watch the football were pro-devolution. This gave the anti-devolutionists their chance to throw out the proposals.

Perhaps learning the lesson we see four years later, in 1978, that the Hamilton by-election was moved to Wednesday 31st May 1978 as the opening game of the 1978 World Cup was on the Thursday 1st June. This was the last time a by-election was not held on a Thursday.

In addition to Euro 2016, we see that a month later in August the 2016 Olympic games will be held in Brazil (and the Paralympics in September). Following on from a media narrative on how England and the other Home Nations have conducted themselves, attention will then turn to the Olympics with the lead up consisting of headlines of variations on the obligatory theme of whether the stadia and infrastructure has been built yet.

2016 will be a summer of sport. With a Prime Minister having such a weak hand in terms of his EU referendum it's very unlikely he is going to risk having his message overwhelmed by a narrative concerned with other priorities.

EU Referendum: The Cameron Ploy

 

We have noted before the advantages the leavers have over the 1975 referendum campaign. One of course is the internet, another is the Electoral Commission, which has gone some way to ensure that the ballot paper and the question will be relatively neutral which is in contrast to 1975. 

Crucially another advantage we have is a weak opposition general in the form of Cameron. It's clear he did not want a referendum nor does he want to leave the EU. That he has offered a referendum against his wishes was more a reflection of his political weakness at the time not his view that he thinks he's confident that he can win it.

We know this because he has made a serious of political mistakes. His referendum offer was made due to pressure from backbenchers in the belief that such a promise would win help him the 2015 election - and it was an offer made regardless of what concessions Cameron thought he could agree from Brussels. It is very likely he chose 2017 as the UK takes over the Presidency of the Council of the EU rather than any other consideration.

Cameron's fundamentally weak position is exposed by his change of strategy three times since promising a referendum, changes made necessary by the EU not wishing to bend over backwards to accommodate UK demands:

Initially Cameron attempted to hijack a new EU treaty - Fundamental Law - a treaty which was, and still is, necessary to try to resolve the Eurozone crisis. Confident in 2013 that a new treaty was imminently forthcoming, and all the indications at the time suggested it was, Cameron attempted to hijack it with the threat of a UK veto unless demands for reform and repatriation of powers were met. His Bloomberg speech in 2013 made this clear. In response the EU 'parked' the treaty temporarily to nullify the threat.

Rebuffed by the EU on this Cameron had to change tack and attempted to try somewhat limited reform via Article 48. Here he narrowed down "reform" to cover one subject, and one subject only – immigration. The idea being that against all the odds Cameron could pull off a quick treaty and come home in triumph, waving a piece of paper while at the same time shooting UKIP's immigrant fox.

Yet realistically all he could achieve would be minor treaty changes, he knew though that upon bringing his "deal" back from Brussels, we would be waiting to dissect it and tell everyone that it doesn't match his "promise".  Thus the need to remove the purdah period which would give Cameron the opportunity to spring the so-called "deal" on us at the last minute, leaving us little time to scrutinise it.

It's interesting therefore to note the eagerness in recent days with which Cameron has conceded the Electoral Commission's advice on the question and particularly on purdah. This suggests strongly that any kind of Article 48 renegotiation, or indeed any other, before a referendum is no longer a central part of Mr Cameron's strategy. The outcome has become irrelevant:

David Cameron is backing down on his refusal to impose a period of “purdah” in the runup to the EU referendum in a concession to his Eurosceptic backbenchers. It is understood the changes will impose purdah with a few exceptions to allow ministers to carry on with essential business.

This then leaves only Associate Membership, via a new Treaty, which amounts to nothing more than a re-branding of what we already have. Here we have clear indication from Cameron that it will be sold to us as a "looser" relationship:

"I want the European Union to be a success. And I want a relationship between Britain and the EU that keeps us in it"

A "looser relationship" that would mean a two tier arrangement as noted by the Times without the term Associate Membership being used:

[David] Owen [author of Europe Restructured] argues — surely correctly — that David Cameron’s idea of removing ourselves from a commitment to “ever closer union” should be a much more ambitious proposal. The prime minister should argue for a community restructured into two parts: the eurozone and the single market. Or to put it another way, the Union and the Community.

The eurozone — the Union — would acquire, in addition to the powers the EU already has, much greater fiscal control. And it would gradually develop the democratic institutions necessary to exercise that control with consent.

Owen’s idea of a Community would bring together EU members outside the eurozone, including the UK, with countries such as Norway, Iceland and, he argues, Turkey, in a looser free trade area clearly based on independent nation states.

The ground is being laid therefore for Cameron to pass off Associate Membership as his own idea despite that it's been part of a draft EU Treaty since October 2013. And within in this looser relationship - which would seek to bring in Norway, Iceland and Switzerland thus abolishing EFTA and the EEA - the UK will be seen as a leader in the outer ring, while the inner ring, or inner core, form the eurozone.

In reality this new arrangement will be the B-road rather than the Autobahn to "ever closer union". Yet despite that the journey maybe slower the destination is still the same. And it will be a reality Cameron seeks to hide behind curtains, rather like the Wizard of Oz, pictured above. It may seek to be impressive but Cameron has an extremely weak hand. Pull back the curtains and we're left seeing clearly a little man pretending.

All we need to do is pull back the curtains.
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