My previous piece reflected on the free bet that is the offer of a referendum in 2017. It maybe that Cameron doesn’t deliver, and that is of course a risk, but it’s the only offer currently on the table. We should remember that extracting this promise from Cameron has long been UKIP policy. For example in 2011 (2 years after “cast iron”)
Farage had this to say:
…Ukip could form an electoral pact with the Conservatives at the next election if David Cameron were to promise a referendum on membership of the European Union. There was "every chance of forcing David Cameron into giving us a referendum", he said. Whether or not to propose an electoral pact with the Conservatives in 2015 would be a "huge decision" for the party, he said. But he had offered the Tories a pact before the 2010 election, he said.
Given Cameron’s track record it’s reasonable not to trust him, though that would imply that other politicians can be trusted. However in my view the question of trust doesn’t come into it. If Cameron wins in 2015, albeit with a small majority, he won’t have any choice but to deliver lest the party give him an offer he can’t refuse. Less a case of trust, more a case of pure political calculation.
If there is to be a referendum in 2017 then another obvious concern is that it will be loaded in favour of staying in. It’s worth noting at this point that exit is very unlikely to ever occur without a referendum being offered and won. The precedent for constitutional change has now been set with the referendum in 1975, Scottish & Welsh devolution, the AV vote and the Scottish independence vote. Nor indeed can we expect ‘perfect conditions’ for one being held.
It’s certainly going to be a challenge to overturn the message of the establishment, media and FUD all of which will be heavily funded. An example of this was during our entry into the then EEC where pro market lobby groups were co-ordinated under the umbrella of the European Movement part funded by the EU Commission to act as an integral part of the government campaign. Efforts were made to bring the media on board particularly the BBC where eurosceptic presenters were dismissed in favour of more sympathetic ones.
However this is not 1975, the world has moved on in 40 years and as a consequence we do have a number of potential advantages over that campaign which can help nullify if not overcome the challenges.
The EU:
The first advantage is that the EU is no longer just the EEC or a ‘Common Market’. In some 40 years since UK membership the EU has taken ever larger strides towards political union such that its ultimate goal has become much more obvious.
Now it is a ‘European Union’ rather than a ‘Market’. By calling it a “Common Market” meant the 1975 referendum was defined by the terms pro-marketeers and anti-marketeers – membership argued in simple economic terms. Thus in this context Wilson was able to get away with his sham negotiations by reducing it down to the level of import quotas on New Zealand butter and cheese.
40 years on, Cameron could not get away with anything so lightweight. It’s no longer a Market but a Union. Thus there would be demands for a far more
substantial return of powers - none of which can be achieved without Treaty change. And that leads us neatly onto the next advantage...
David Cameron:
As has been well documented Cameron did not want a referendum nor does he want to leave the EU. That he has offered a referendum against his wishes is a reflection of his political weakness not his view that he thinks he can win it. We know this because he has made a political mistake. His offer was due to being under pressure from backbenchers who in turn are under pressure from UKIP in the belief that such a promise would win him the next election, and it is an offer made regardless of what concessions Cameron thinks he can spin from Brussels. It is very likely he chose the date as the UK takes over the Presidency of the Council of the EU rather than any other consideration.
The reform option has always been dangerous as it splits the “out” vote to the benefit of those who wish to remain EU members. However Cameron’s promise largely negates the reform option as he can’t possibly hope to have any substantial concessions which he can put to the electorate by 2017. The changes needed to the founding Treaties simply cannot be achieved in time. Thus all he can rely on is what will be unconvincing spin without substance.
And this is where his track record of ‘PR man’, ‘cast iron’ and ‘lack of trust’ becomes an asset to the out campaign. Without Treaty change it will be spin few will believe and it is a mistake we can capitalise on. A mistake that Clegg appears to
appreciate very acutely during the Lib Dem conference:
The Lib Dem leader said he was committed to a vote when there was EU treaty reform, but criticised the "arbitrary date" of 2017 set by the Conservatives.
It’s worth noting that the Scottish referendum also had superficial promises of the reform option announced by, among others, Gordon Brown who tried to rewrite the UK constitution on the back of a fag packet in
an impassioned speech by offering essentially devo-max to the Scots. Yet the pledge of reform made little difference to the final results which were in line with months of predictions by the polls. Other core substantive issues instead decided the referendum which we will explore later in this piece.
Experience:
The 1975 referendum was the first ever in the UK, thus there was no real direct experience to draw upon. As a result many mistakes by both sides were made, not least in the failure of establishing a coherent message particularly from the anti-marketeers - with the word 'anti' portraying negative connotations, In contrast we have the opportunity to learn not only from the referendum of 1975 but subsequent ones over AV and Scottish independence, and we can endeavour to try not to repeat mistakes made there.
The Internet:
In 1975 the media and all the newspapers bar one – the communist Morning Star – supported EEC membership. Such support would be similar today, including from the likes of the Daily Mail which in editorials has made it clear it supports EU membership.
However unlike 1975 we now have the internet and everything that comes with it; smartphones, Twitter, Facebook and forums. The establishment no longer has a monopoly on information. Scotland revealed the significance of this development. The independence campaign was a dry run of how an EU referendum would be conducted and it showed comprehensively that unofficial campaigns centered on social media was very powerful.
Indeed the Scottish referendum has revealed that social networking via Twitter and Facebook played a very significant part in the vigorous and intellectual debate to the extent that the
“yes” vote remained strong in the final outcome:
The 2008 US election showed how politicians could use it as a campaigning tool, but it wasn't until the Scottish referendum that Britain really caught up.
According to Facebook, more than 10 million interactions were made about the fight in a month. So who won the social media wars - and what can we learn from it? The simple answer is: the Yes campaign was victorious.
The official Twitter account of the Yes campaign has an impressive 103,000 followers compared to 42,000 for Better Together. Alex Salmond boasts 95,000 Twitter followers and Nicola Sturgeon has 66,000 - while Alistair Darling has just 21,000. On Facebook, the Yes campaign page attracted more than 320,000 likes compared to 218,000 for the No.
But debate was not only held on the most well known outlets, there was much passionate debate on forums such as
Celtic Football Club’s which ran to an impressive 1674 pages.
It’s also worth noting that during any campaign the URL address
http://www.eureferendum.com/ would be much sought after – and this is already registered by Richard North. Typing the words “EU Referendum” into a search engine and links to the country’s premier eurosceptic blog comes
top of the search results.
Thus with the internet we can bypass the mainstream media. This is a tactic that was used by Farage in UKIP’s early days. Comprehensively ignored at the time by the media, Farage went under the radar by taking the message direct to people by travelling the country and addressing local meetings. He was to replicate this method in 2013 with the
Common Sense tour.
As UKIP proved, such methods can be very effective in getting the message across despite the bias of the legacy media and so it can prove with a referendum in 2017.
There's a strong anti-establishment vote:
Unlike 1975 where there was more deference to the political system, we now have the obvious decadence
of Westminster politics. A decadence which reveals itself by the
increasingly lack of quality in MPs, hopeless leadership, the lack
of relevance of political parties with
membership plummeting, and the
electorate itself being treated with contempt and
their anger in return.
Revulsion
at this decadence and alienation from Westminster is common to both
England and Scotland. In England it expresses itself partly in UKIP; in
Scotland it helps power the SNP.
Thus unlike 1975, the parties of
Westminster campaigning as one in 2017 to stay in the EU could actually prove to be useful as part of an
effective anti-establishment campaign which when based around sound exit answers can win
over a lot of people, as was shown in Scotland.
The establishment is not always united:
The Scottish referendum illustrated that the establishment campaign epitomised by Better Together was not always united. Although they shared the same aims of keeping the union together the fundamental differences between parties and between themselves could not help coming to the fore. Gordon Brown was sidelined until the last minute, Darling was consistently criticised for running a poor campaign, for example in
May 2014:
Alistair Darling has effectively been dumped as head of the campaign to keep Scotland in the UK following crisis cross-party talks.
And naturally there were tensions between the
Tories and Labour:
A Labour MSP has criticised his party’s decision to “hold hands” with
the Tories in the ‘Better Together’ alliance against Scottish
independence and has claimed that the No campaign is now unable to
“outline a coherent vision”.
Then arguments over "
reform"
The Better Together campaign has been accused of “spiralling into
self-destruction” after UK cabinet ministers appeared at odds over
enhanced devolution proposals.
And after the
vote:
Ed Miliband today publicly snubbed Gordon Brown after thanking every Labour MP who campaigned against Scottish independence – apart from the former Labour leader.
The 'in' campaign is likely to be as split as the 'out' one.
Having a major party on board is not always necessary:
As the SNP found out to its cost, a major party with an official position does not always mean party supporters and members follow suit - voters in Salmond's own 'backyard' of Aberdeenshire gave independence the
thumbs down. Official positions of Labour and the Tories in an EU referendum are likely to be very different to its members when deciding on an EU referendum and there are likely to be splits within.
The question has already been decided:
Should Cameron endeavour to progress with a referendum then it's out of the question that he can manipulate the question. The Electoral Commission has already given its advice to Parliament - the full details of its advice can be found
here. In
summary it advises:
If Parliament wants to retain the use of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ as response options to the referendum question, then the Commission has recommended that that the question should be amended to:
'Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?'
If Parliament decides not to retain a ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ question, the Commission has recommended the following referendum question:
'Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?'
The European Economic Area (EEA):
Unlike in 1975 we have an off-shelf economic model in form of the EEA which can successfully nullify the FUD which will undoubtedly be deployed to portray by fear that leaving would be economically disastrous. The EEA was designed as a ‘stepping stone in’ for reluctant countries such as Norway and this can very easily be used as a ‘stepping stone out’. The
economic arguments of 1975 would be made redundant:
Let us be clear about one thing: In or out of the Common Market, it will be tough going for Britain over the next few years.
In or out, we would still have been hit by the oil crisis, by rocketing world prices for food and raw materials.
But we will be in a much stronger position to face the future if we stay inside the Market than if we try to go it alone.
Inside, we can count on more secure supplies of food if world harvests turn out to be bad. And we can help to hold down Market food prices - as we have done since we joined in 1973.
The EEA therefore allows us to sideline the economic arguments effectively and so use the referendum to concentrate on the political aspects of the EU which prove to be so
unpalatable for the British people (my emphasis):
Public opinion is divided on the detail of Britain’s role in Europe, however. Around three in ten each would prefer to see ‘Britain’s relationship with Europe remaining broadly the same as at present’ (32%) and ‘Britain returning to being part of an economic community, without political links’ (30%). One in five would like to see ‘Britain leaving the European Union altogether’ (20%), with ‘closer political and economic integration’ with other EU member states the least favoured option (13%).”
The 1970's pessimism has gone:
It's not unreasonable to suggest that the early 1970s provided probably the only window of opportunity to have joined the EEC. The UK was beset by a national lack of self confidence not long after "
Great Britain had lost an Empire and had not yet found a role", the Suez crisis, devaluation in the 1960's, a global recession, spiralling inflation, collapse of Britain's traditional manufacturing industries and rising unemployment and industrial unrest.
With this in mind it's easy to understand why the UK sought refuge in the EEC. Yet largely as the result of the Thatcher reforms of the 1980s, the UK escaped from the inward straightjacket of its past. Rather than pessimism overshadowing the next referendum a confident UK will now be able to take advantage, outside the EU, of the dominating factor of trade...
Globalisation:
Nothing illustrates the ever decreasing need for single market access for the UK than the rise of globalisation. This is the EU's redundancy notice, its P45. The EU is a relic of the 20th century, a time when the cold war dominated, when memories of war on the continent were still painfully fresh. Yet during the late 1970s and 1980s we had the emergence of other markets such as Japan.
Fueled by the evolution of technology, improved transport (
Containerisation) and the growth of multinational companies and trading blocks globalisation is now the dominating factor. With the growth of China and India, the United States for example is increasingly looking east rather than to the EU in terms of importance of trade.
With globalisation has come the increasing importance of global bodies setting international standards.
The Single Market, is a collection of
regulation which drives the harmonisation of standards, with a view to
not only facilitate trade throughout the Communities but to lead to increasing "political union" in the EU. It has primarily a political objective not an economic one.
However the EU acquis of harmonisation is gradually being replaced by international
regulation which does not have the same political overtones. As such the EU loses its European distinctiveness and simply becomes a property
shared by all members of the WTO, which they will all use as the basis
for international trade. The EU's Single Market thus will become redundant. Gradually it is being
replaced by the globalised market.
As it stands, as long as we are in the EU, we have a subordinate
position, (only 8% of the vote within the EU) on international bodies and the agreements on international standards are negotiated
and approved by the EU on our behalf.
However EFTA/EEA countries such as Norway are able to
negotiate for themselves at the top international table and only after they have agreed them are they
then processed into actionable law and passed down to regional trading areas such as the EU. The following graph illustrates how this works:
The early '70's demonstrated the UK's lack of ambition and self-confidence by tying itself to an inward-looking customs union based on the European continent. A 2017 referendum will give the opportunity to argue instead for a vision which was not available in 1975 - a vision that embraces the globalisation one which the UK can fully participate in.
An Exit Plan:
With the above in mind it is essential then that there is a detailed, workable and credible exit plan. Nothing illustrates this better than what has been very apparent from the Scottish independence referendum. The 'yes' campaign was not undermined by
FUD, nor by the closing of ranks by the establishment, nor by a loaded referendum question
nor by the lack of funds. Instead what the polls clearly showed is Salmond lost primarily due to not answering the
currency question:
Meanwhile so far as the issues are concerned, if the Yes side does lose
it will probably have done so not least because it never managed to
persuade a majority of Scots that the country would be more prosperous
under independence. YouGov find in their latest poll that only 35% think
Scotland will be economically better off under independence while as
any as 47% reckon it would be worse off.
And:
Of course, describing the patterns of the kinds of people who were more
or less likely to vote Yes or No does no more than give us clues as to
why people voted they way they did. What we can note at this stage is
that women, older people, those in ABC1 occupations and those born
elsewhere in the UK were all, according to YouGov’s final poll for The Times and The Sun,
relatively pessimistic about the economic consequences of independence.
And as we have repeatedly noted on this site, nothing seemed to matter
more to voters in deciding whether to vote Yes or No than their
perceptions of the economic consequences of leaving the UK.
In other words Salmond did not have a well thought out exit plan to deal with the basics. And failure to address
the core problem of currency if Scotland left the Union then plants further doubts in voters' mind about other
issues such as; defence, NHS,oil, immigration, EU membership, the Monarchy, pensions and so on. If Salmond had provided answers to these then it is very likely we would be looking at an independent Scotland.
One of the fatal flaws of the 1975 campaign was its inability to come up with a credible alternative to then EEC membership, a situation replicated by Salmond. With a fully workable
exit plan we can avoid that flaw and crucially win...
Eurozone:
This is the joker in the pack. Without yet a resolution to the inherent problems of the Eurozone namely it's still only an economic union without the political union necessary its problems are far from
resolved. Given that a referendum is likely to take place in September of 2017 (during the UK Presidency of the Council of the EU) it will be at a time that is traditionally one of market turbulence. We could see a Eurozone crisis right in the middle
of a referendum campaign.
In many ways therefore we can see that winning a referendum in 2017 is perfectly possible. Reluctance to take a calculated risk until conditions are just 'perfect' obviously begs the question if not in 2017, then when?
